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Summary  
Elephants show a rich social organization and display a number of unusual traits. In this 
paper, we analyse reports collected over a thirty-five year period, describing behaviour that 
has the potential to reveal signs of empathic understanding. These include coalition 
formation, the offering of protection and comfort to others, retrieving and ‘babysitting’ 
calves, aiding individuals that would otherwise have difficulty in moving, and removing 
foreign objects attached to others. These records demonstrate that an elephant is capable of 
diagnosing animacy and goal directedness, and is able to understand the physical competence, 
emotional state and intentions of others, when they differ from its own. We argue that an 
empathic understanding of others is the simplest explanation of these abilities, and discuss 
reasons why elephants appear to show empathy more than other non-primate species. 
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Empathy is defined as the ability to share someone else's feelings or experiences by imagining 
what it would be like to be in their situation (Cambridge English Dictionary), often referred to 
as ‘putting oneself into another’s shoes’. Empathy is a component of human consciousness 
(Thompson, 2001), and the ability to detect and respond appropriately to the emotions of 
others is a cornerstone of normal social function. The recent discovery of a mirror system for 
emotional responses in humans has provided evidence for the neurological basis of empathy 
(Jabbi, Swart, & Keysers, 2007; Wicker, Keysers, Plailly, Royet, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2003), 
but little is known about the evolution of this emotional mirror system and to what degree it 
is shared by any other species. Macaque monkeys are known to possess mirror neurons that 
react to the physical actions of others when they match actions in the monkey’s own 
repertoire (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Fogassi, & 
Gallese, 1996), but the analogous emotional mirror system has not yet been identified in non-
human animals. 
It is important, however, for all animals to be able to detect and respond to the content 
and context of conspecifics’ emotional displays. Inappropriate responses to another’s 
aggressive displays, fear reactions, or sexual advances would be maladaptive and potentially 
fatal; that animals respond appropriately in these circumstances suggests they have at least a 
rudimentary form of emotion recognition system. But human abilities go beyond simply 
reading and responding to an emotional display in the present: we can also model emotional 
states and desired goals that influence others’ behaviour in the past and future, and use this to 
plan our own actions. Do any animals share these advanced abilities, and if so can they be 
understood as the result of empathic responses to other individuals? 
Simple forms of empathy, such as emotional contagion, have been used to explain 
contagious yawning, scratching, and the behavioural copying shown in the play and 
aggression of chimpanzees and Japanese macaques (Anderson, Myowa-Yamakoshi, & 
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Matsuzawa, 2004; de Waal, 2008; Parr, Waller, & Fugate, 2005). Parr et al argue that ‘this 
type of emotional awareness functions to coordinate activity among group members, facilitate 
social cohesion and motivate conciliatory tendencies, and is likely to play a key role in 
coordinating social behaviours in large-brained social primates’. However, behavioural 
contagion is also evident in chickens, and all these phenomena can be explained with simple 
models of response facilitation (Byrne, 1994; Hoppitt, Blackburn, & Laland, 2007). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that even a behaviour as seemingly simple as contagious 
yawning does relate to empathic understanding in humans, so behavioural contagion may 
well be a precursor to, or simplified form of, sophisticated empathic abilities (Lehmann, 
1979). Chimpanzees have been suggested to show higher levels of empathy, such as in the 
behaviour described as ‘consolation’, whereby an uninvolved bystander reassures one of the 
individuals involved in an agonistic interaction  (de Waal & Aureli, 1996). 
It seems most appropriate to look for evidence of empathy in species that live in 
coherent, coordinated social groups, where individuals have both opportunity and reason to 
model the behaviour, emotions, and mental states of conspecifics. One such species is the 
African elephant. Elephants are long-lived, slowly developing, large brained mammals that 
live in closely bonded societies (Bates, Poole, & Byrne, 2008; Douglas-Hamilton & Douglas-
Hamilton, 1975; Moss, 1988). Female savannah elephants remain within the same family 
group throughout their lives, and ‘allomothering’ (caring for another’s offspring) for female 
associates is common and important for calf survival (Lee, 1987a; Moss & Poole, 1983). 
Furthermore, elephants are known to possess complex auditory, olfactory and visual 
communication systems (Langbauer Jr, 2000; McComb, Moss, Sayialel, & Baker, 2000; 
Poole, 1998; Poole, 1999; Poole & Granli, 2003). Given these characteristics, it seems 
reasonable to predict that elephants would benefit from being able to identify the underlying 
emotions and desires of others. In this paper, we explore whether African savannah elephants, 
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a species that has not shared a common ancestor with humans for at least 103 million years 
(Murphy et al., 2001), exhibit any signs of advanced empathic ability.  
Elephants’ well-documented interest in the carcasses and bones of dead conspecifics 
might be viewed as evidence of their empathic nature, although the biological functions of 
these behaviours are yet to be determined (Douglas-Hamilton, Bhalla, Wittemyer, & Vollrath, 
2006; McComb, Baker, & Moss, 2006). Furthermore, elephants have recently been suggested 
to pass mirror self-recognition tests (Plotnik, de Waal, & Reiss, 2006), and Gallup (1982) has 
linked the capacity for empathy with the ability for mirror self-recognition. However, it 
should be noted that Plotnik’s paper did not follow the accepted protocol for tests of self-
recognition, as defined by Gallup (1970), and earlier attempts to show mirror self-recognition 
in elephants have failed (Povinelli, 1989), so this remains a contentious claim. 
Here we present observational reports of wild elephants that appear to respond to the 
emotional states of others, i.e. cases where an empathetic understanding may be implicated, 
as recorded during a continuous 35-year study of African elephants. We consider the 
mechanisms of each of these reported cases, in terms of how they could be modelled 
cognitively.  
We accept that this approach is controversial for two reasons. Firstly, the application 
of cognitive models is contentious. In principle, the acquisition of all non-innate behaviours 
can be explained as classical or instrumental conditioning (Skinner, 1953), just as all such 
behaviours can also be understood cognitively (Byrne & Bates, 2006; Tomasello & Call, 
1997). It is often suggested that if behaviour can be explained as conditioning, there is no 
need to apply cognitive terminology. Conditioning explanations are purportedly more 
‘parsimonious’ because they do not attribute any mental processes: indeed, it is often falsely 
imagined that using cognitive models to describe behavioural complexity implies greater 
‘intelligence’ than reliance on associative explanations. Unfortunately, conditioning accounts 
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of complex behaviours are typically derived in a post-hoc, and therefore unfalsifiable, fashion 
(Byrne & Bates, 2006).  We favour cognitive terminology in this paper purely because it 
allows predictive models to be developed that can subsequently be tested and potentially 
falsified. The application of cognitive models does not in itself imply anything about our 
expectation of the level of cognitive skill to be found in elephants.  
Secondly, this approach is controversial for its use of observational records of 
behaviour, often collected ad libitum, instead of controlled experimental trials. Several 
experimental paradigms have been developed to test mental-state and emotional-state 
recognition in primates (Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000; Hare, Call, & Tomasello, 
2001; Parr, 2001), but adapting these tests to non-primate species often proves difficult and 
lacks ecological validity. Whilst few experimental tests of captive elephant behaviour have 
succeeded in engaging the potential subjects, there is a wealth of knowledge of wild elephant 
behaviour available from long-term study sites. For this reason, we base our study on 
observational field records taken from the longest running African savannah elephant study 
site, in Amboseli National Park, Kenya. This approach allows us to consider elephants’ 
empathic skills within their particular ecological context: the problems faced by the elephants 
here are real and relevant to their success.  
 
Methods 
Study site and population 
The Amboseli ecosystem of southern Kenya is a semi-arid savannah. The Amboseli elephant 
population has been studied continuously for over 35 years by members of the Amboseli 
Trust for Elephants (ATE), set up by Cynthia Moss and Harvey Croze in 1972 (see 
www.elephanttrust.org).  During this time, over 2200 elephants have been identified and 
named (Moss, 2001) and at December 2006 the population stood at 1434 living elephants, 
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divided into fifty-eight family units, with approximately 300 independent males. All the 
elephants in the population are habituated to the ATE project vehicles, allowing observation 
of behaviour at close range. 
 
Data collection 
Since 1975, three long-term researchers - Cynthia Moss (CM), Joyce Poole (JP), and Phyllis 
Lee (PL), and three permanent research staff – Norah Njiraini (NN), Soila Sayialel (SS), and 
Katito Sayialel (KS), have provided the bulk of ATE elephant data collection, totalling 
approximately 480 months of daily elephant observations between them. Data collected 
during this time has included focal sampling of mothers and infants (CM, PL), focal sampling 
of males (JP), focal behaviour sampling of a family group (JP), scan sampling of infant 
activity (PL), and ad libitum recording of interactions between elephants (all).  Additionally, 
research staff census family units using the Park in order to maintain accurate demographic 
records of the Amboseli elephant population. In all records cited, two-letter codes (e.g. AA, 
EB) signify the names of family groups, whereas names or numbers (e.g. Echo, M27) signify 
individuals. 
 
Data analysis 
Bates and Byrne (2007) have argued that analysis of observational records, where each single 
record may be called an anecdote, can be a useful scientific tool if approached systematically. 
Firstly, only written reports, recorded at the time of occurrence by experienced observers, 
should be included in any such analysis. Reports used should conform to a strict, pre-
determined definition of the behaviour of interest. Reports can then be separated according to 
the details of the behaviour observed, and any categories where only single records exist must 
be discounted as un-interpretable (McGrew, 2004). Categories of behaviour that provide 
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multiple independent observations of the event can then be examined to determine the 
minimum cognitive apparatus necessary to allow such behaviour. This approach generates 
testable and falsifiable hypotheses regarding the underlying cognitive mechanisms of 
behaviour.  
The original data-sheets and notes used to record all elephant observations were made 
available to LB and RB. We extracted 255 reports of behaviour that potentially illustrated 
empathic responses to distressing situations, according to the following working definition: 
‘A voluntary, active response to another individual’s current or imminent distress or danger, 
that actually or potentially reduces that distress or danger’. 
Six records described events that were recorded only once, and so were deemed un-
interpretable and were excluded from further analysis. The remaining 249 records were 
assigned to one of the categories detailed below, according to the type of socio-ecological 
problem addressed by the behaviour.  
 
Coalitions  
In aggressive or hazardous situations, two or more individuals {a & b} may work 
simultaneously and in a cohesive manner against another individual or individuals {x}.  
 
Protection  
When a young or injured individual is in a potentially dangerous situation, but is unable to 
defend itself sufficiently, it may receive protection from another elephant. Such ‘protection’ 
is distinct from coalition behaviour, as here the individual being protected is unable to protect 
itself, usually because it is too small or too sick.  
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Comfort  
Interactions were deemed ‘comforting’ rather than protective if the recipient was distressed 
but not in any actual danger. A wide range of routine behaviour performed towards young 
calves by older female elephants have been described as maternal or allomaternal comfort 
(Lee, 1987a). Females may comfort calves in various ways: by touching or cradling an 
immature animal with the trunk; touching an immature with the body, or allowing the 
immature to lean on or touch oneself; and by tolerating comfort suckling, whereby a calf 
attempts to suckle from an adolescent or adult female that is not its mother. Previously, 
allosuckling (suckling another’s calf) has been discussed with respect to nutrition (Lee, 
1987a), but as that is not our focus we include all tolerated allosuckling attempts, irrespective 
of whether the female is lactating. 
 
Babysitting  
When a calf is separated from its mother for a prolonged period, one or more other females 
may show interest in and/or direct care towards the calf. This is termed babysitting, and is 
often seen when a calf has been orphaned, or has strayed from its family. This category 
essentially draws on the protective and comforting behaviours of females, in the specific 
situation of a calf that has been separated from its mother for at least several hours. 
 
Retrievals  
When a calf has been temporarily separated from its family group, older females from the 
family may act to return the calf to its natal group. In the category of retrieval, we include 
fetching individuals that have wandered away from their group, been left behind, or been 
kidnapped. 
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Assisting mobility  
When an individual has fallen over, become stuck in mud, water or other difficult terrain, or 
is unable to proceed forward for any other reason, other elephants may assist so that the stuck 
individual can resume travelling. Acts used to assist mobility include picking up, pushing, 
and pulling, using the trunk, tusks or feet.  
 
Removing foreign objects  
When an elephant has a foreign object such as a veterinary dart or spear protruding from its 
body, another individual or individuals may touch or attempt to remove the object.  
 
Having categorized each record, we then attempted to determine the minimum necessary 
cognitive attributions made by the elephant before it performed the behaviour that aided the 
distressed individual (see Table 1).  
 
Results 
Coalitions (seventeen cases) 
The coalitions were always aimed at adults, and were always formed by two or more adults 
grouping together to threaten or chase away one or more other, unrelated adults. Coalitions 
were formed to instigate a threat (nine times) but also in retaliation to threats from the 
adversary (eight times). Four coalitions were formed by males helping other males of a 
similar age. Thirteen coalitions were formed by adult females, always with related females 
(mother-daughter pairs in seven cases, close matrilineal relatives – siblings, aunts and nieces, 
cousins, - in five cases, and a more distant matrilineal relative in one case). No mixed sex 
coalitions were recorded, and most were targeted against same-sex adversaries (thirteen 
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cases). All coalitions recorded were successful, in that the target of the coalition moved away 
from the area. 
 
Cognitive processes underlying coalitions 
Coalitions are commonly discussed in ethological literature, but are rarely considered as 
potentially empathic. In all cases included here, only one of the coalition partners {a} was 
originally engaging in the agonistic behaviour with the adversary {x}: the partner who joined 
{b} could have remained uninvolved, but after they joined the interaction, the single 
adversary {x} moved away. The joining of {a} and {b} in a coalition effectively eliminated 
the potential danger to {a}. The decision of {b} to act alongside {a} must ultimately be based 
on selfishness at the kin selection level (or reciprocal altruism between males), but a causal 
explanation of how {b} decides to act is also necessary. In cases where the behaviour was 
retaliatory, {b} may have acted because it perceived the threat from {x} as directed to itself, 
that is, the coalition behaviour may have been entirely coincidental. However, this 
explanation cannot be applied to the instigation of an attack. At a minimum, this requires an 
understanding of animacy of the other elephant, recognition of another’s emotion (from threat 
and fear displays), and goal directedness of the other, whereby {b} understands that the threat 
behaviours of others {a} are directed at displacing another individual {x}.   
 
Protection (twenty-nine cases) 
Most reports relate to protection of calves under one year old (twenty-seven cases). The 
exceptions were one for a calf of five years, and one for an adult female who had been 
speared and was immobile. Members of a different family were harassing the latter, and her 
adult daughters were observed to push the threatening individuals away. In sixteen of the 
cases involving calves, it was the mother who acted. Only three of these mothers were 
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primiparous (first-time mothers); the thirteen others were experienced mothers with at least 
one calf born previously. In the twelve cases where an allomother acted, five were parous 
females (females who have given birth at least once), and seven were young nulliparous 
females (females who have never given birth).  
In most cases (twenty-two), the protectors acted before any harm had actually come to 
the individual, and so before it had actually given any obvious vocal or visual signal of 
distress. In the remaining seven cases, the calves were pulled away from a situation after they 
had been attacked or received a fright. The ‘pre-emptive’ reports of protection occur in five 
situation types:  
Chasing predators away from newborns (two cases);  
“At 11.00 a.m. find the EB’s… The baby comes over to the car and started feeling it. 
Just then Echo chased off a hyena and trumpeted. Immediately the calf whirled around 
and went back to Echo and at the same time Enid, Elspeth and Eudora came rushing 
over, their heads up and ears out and they joined Echo in a broad front facing the 
direction that the hyena went in.”   
CJM: 21 August 1994. 
Stopping play fights between calves (four cases);  
“At 17h45, Ely and Esau start playing, chasing and trying to mount one another.  
They’re head to head and Enid goes over to them and clearly pushes Esau away with 
her tusks.  She does it three times and is getting in between them, breaking them up.  
Esau keeps going around her to get back at Ely.”  
CJM: 10 November 1992.   
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Pushing individuals away from calves (five males, five females);  
“As she moves, Echo stops, rumbles, ear flaps and looks back. Karl arrives from the 
east.  He is smelling. Echo lifts her tusks and pushes him away from her {one day 
old} baby. Echo continues slowly, stopping and starting, rumbling and looking back.”  
CJM: 08 May 1994. 
Keeping calves away from young males and females (four cases);  
“Time 12:25.  At the start of the watch, Susan is mud splashing and SU9 is sitting in 
the mud at the edge.  Two minutes into the sample, SU9 backs away from a young 
male.  Sally then pulls SU9 closer to her, under her chin, at the approach of the young 
male.  SU9 goes around her while Sally and the young male spar.”  
CJM: 27 August 1980. 
Preventing calves from moving into dangerous areas (two cases); 
“At 9.30, the EB family go to the big wallow. Most of them get right in. Eventually 
Echo and the baby came.  Echo splashed, getting mud on the baby too but backed 
away from the edge, looking and keeping the baby with her.” 
CJM: 11 May 1994. 
 
Cognitive processes underlying protection 
The twenty-three cases of ‘pre-emptive’ protection suggest that the protector is empathic in 
the sense of predicting the distress that the calf will feel if the current situation is not stopped. 
As the calves were not necessarily experiencing any distress, the protector could not always 
be responding simply to the direct perception of pain signals or distress responses by the calf. 
Instead, they must at least have been using their past experiences with such interactions, e.g. 
they have learned that boisterous young males are dangerous to young infants, or play fighting 
with larger calves can cause distress. They must have recognised the situation as conforming 
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to that type, and taken action to prevent the distress from occurring. The fact that older, 
experienced mothers account for 64% of the protective behaviours observed suggests that 
successful protection is shaped by experience. Therefore, these cases provide evidence that 
the actor could attribute animacy, goal directedness, and emotional attribution to another 
individual.   
 
Comfort (129 records) 
Lee (1987) showed mothers and allomothers frequently touch young calves, and maintain 
close proximity to them, although the rate of touching and degree of closeness declines as the 
calf ages. In this analysis, thirty-five records of reassuring immatures were extracted, with 
each always directed to calves under two years old. In 61% of cases (n=21) the calves were 
newborns or less than one month old (76% less than 12months old), and in 42% (n=15) the 
comfort-reassurance behaviour was preceded by the calf giving a distress vocalisation. In one 
case where no vocalisation was recorded, the calves (twins) were noted as standing with  
‘heads up’ in an alarm posture, and in 9% (n=3) of cases the calves initiated the physical 
contact themselves, by touching their bodies against an allomother. In 45% (n=16) of cases, 
calves received comfort without showing any obvious external behavioural cues.  
Comfort allosuckling by calves was recorded on ninety-two occasions. Only one of 
these records describes comfort suckling by an immature older than two years (a six year old 
male was allowed to comfort suckle from an adolescent female in his family). In all but one 
case, the calf and older female were from the same family or bond group. In forty-seven of 
the ninety-two cases, it was a parous female who allowed another’s calf to suckle from her. 
Adolescents under the age of 13 were only recorded to allosuckle calves on fifteen occasions. 
Two negative examples, where allosuckling attempts were refused, concerned adult females 
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who had calves of their own and thus would have been lactating. One of these was from the 
same family as the refused calf, and the other was not.  
 
Cognitive processes underlying comfort behaviours 
The frequency of comfort behaviour suggests that elephants are very sensitive to the 
emotional needs of calves. In approximately half of the cases, comfort occurred when a calf 
was obviously distressed, with the distress most often conveyed by auditory emotional 
communication signals. In these cases, the mother or allomother has to recognise the 
emotional signals of the calf, and respond appropriately by offering comfort. In principle, 
comfort might be offered because of an understanding of wants and needs, in the absence of 
any expression of emotion. But in these cases, the most parsimonious explanation is that the 
mother was responding to the emotions of the calf. 
Where comfort was shown to calves without any obvious external behavioural cues 
from the calf, it is harder to determine the ontogeny of the mother’s behaviour. However, we 
suggest that seeking physical contact with calves may require no stimuli other than the 
appearance and subsequent recognition of the young calf, and is most likely an innate 
behavioural response of females based on an attribution of animacy towards elephant calves. 
Attraction to young calves is thought to serve an important evolutionary function in elephant 
families, increasing calf survival and enhancing the stability of the group (Lee, 1987a). 
Comfort suckling was always initiated by calves, and so required little action on the 
part of the older female. In the two cases where allosuckling was refused, the female 
evidently discriminated the calf as not her own. In both reports the calf’s actions are 
described as ‘tried to suckle’ suggesting it had at least raised its trunk towards the female’s 
breast. Recognition of the goal towards which the calf’s actions were directed, or attribution 
of goal directedness, is implied by the active refusal of the adult.  
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Babysitting (twenty-one cases) 
On six occasions, an unknown calf was seen with an un-related family whose members 
showed some care of the calf. The calf did not survive for more than a few weeks in any of 
these cases, although the precise time taken for the calf to die depended upon its age and 
condition when it was orphaned or otherwise separated from its mother. All other cases of 
babysitting occurred within the calf’s natal family. Six refer to orphaned calves; in four of 
these, the calf only survived 1-2 months after its mother’s death. The other two calves are 
currently still alive, after five and three years respectively. In nine cases, the separation was 
temporary, and the calf was safely reunited with its mother after being cared for by 
babysitting family members. 
 
Cognitive processes underlying babysitting 
Babysitting is most obviously explained as an over-extension of a female’s natural tendency 
to care for calves: occasionally females make the ‘mistake’ of targeting care at non-kin 
calves. Babysitting can be considered a natural consequence of comforting and allomothering 
calves, and so probably relies on the same cognitive attributions of animacy and, on occasion, 
emotion, to the calf. The physical presence or absence of the mothers may not be a critical 
variable: calves are allomothered in both cases. However, babysitting is more common when 
mothers are at a distance from the mother (Lee, 1987a). Rarely, babysitting may ensure a 
calf’s survival even after its mother’s death, although in cases where the calf has yet to be 
weaned, survival almost never results.  
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Retrievals (22 cases) 
All individuals who had to be retrieved were under five years old. Nine calves were retrieved 
from unrelated females or families, six were alone or left behind before being reunited with 
their families, five were pulled away from the ATE observation vehicle, and two were 
retrieved from males to whom they had wandered too close. They were all retrieved either by 
the mother acting alone, or by the mother and another female family member. In nine cases 
the female retrieved the calf following ‘lost call’ vocalisations by the calf, but in the other 
cases no vocalisations were noted. Of the nine who were with unrelated females, six most 
likely occurred because the calf wandered over to the unrelated females, who then began to 
allomother them. But on three occasions it appears that females from dominant families 
actively attempted to remove a newborn calf from the subordinate family and/or resisted the 
retrieval by the mother, as described below: 
“At 10.10, Freda and others move rapidly to the place where the EB’s are resting and 
supplant them. Then they kidnap Ely {Echo’s newborn calf}, and he calls and cries 
out.  Enid stays but Echo has run off and tries to grab him back.  The FB’s stick with 
Ely and at one point he is kicked and knocked down.”   
CJM: 24 March 1990 
 
Cognitive processes underlying retrievals 
Again, this behaviour can be viewed as an extension of the allomothering ‘caretaking’ 
tendencies of female elephants. Retrievals are usually led by the mother, so she must 
differentiate her calf from any others present and respond to its absence. Retrieval behaviour 
sometimes relies on an attribution of emotion to the calf, at least when the mother is 
responding to vocal distress signals, and potentially involves an attribution of goal 
directedness to the adult females who ‘kidnap’ calves.  
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Assisting mobility (28 cases) 
All but one of the immobile individuals were under two years old when helped. The 
exception concerns a mother leading her two-year-old and six-year-old daughters to a cattle-
grid where there was a break in the electric fence that was separating them from her. The 
mother had to break through the electric fence, using her tusks to snap the wire, and then 
enter the enclosure to lead her calves to the safe place to exit (NN: 10 September 2006). The 
following day, the same individuals were again stuck in the enclosure. The youngest could 
not be encouraged to cross the cattle grid for 15 minutes, eventually running over it only 
when the mother walked back on to it herself, facing the calf, and reversed slowly (NN; 11 
September 2006).   
Four records describe leading a calf to terrain that was easier for it to negotiate, such 
as a less steep part of a riverbank or over a cattle grid. Nine records refer to events where a 
calf had fallen over or could not get up and was helped to stand, usually by the mother but in 
one case by an unrelated adult male. In all cases, the calf was helped to its feet by the adult 
using its trunk to lift it, and gently sliding the foot underneath the calf. 
The remaining fifteen records refer to calves who had fallen into ditches or who could 
not climb in or out of mud wallows, rivers or other water channels. The calf was pushed 
(three times) or pulled (nine times) out, or an adult dug the sides of the bank with her tusks, 
which decreased the incline (three times). In thirteen cases, the calf was helped by the mother, 
in the other six cases the calf was helped by other female family members. The passage below 
describes the action of one such allomother:  
“IB’s are crossing Snipe River.  Infant struggles to climb out of bank after its mother.  
An adult female is standing right next to it, and moves closer as the infant struggles, it 
does not push it out with its trunk, but it digs its tusks into the mud behind the calf’s 
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front right leg which acts to provide some anchorage for the calf, who then scrambles 
up.”  
LB & NN: 21 September 2005. 
 
Cognitive processes underlying mobility assistance 
In all cases described here, elephants must have made attributions of animacy and physical 
competence to the individual that was immobile. Attributing emotion is also highly likely in 
some circumstances, such as the eleven cases observed where a calf gave a distress bellow 
vocalisation (seven when it was stuck in a water channel or ditch, and four when it had fallen 
over), although emotion attribution is also possible when no vocalisations were given, for 
example from visual signals of distress or frustration.  
Hart et al (2008) discuss elephants helping disabled conspecifics as evidence that 
elephants attribute mental states: they consider helping implies attributing a mental state of 
‘disablement’, an example of ‘targeted empathic helping’. We suggest that mental state 
attribution may not be necessary to understand these data; an understanding of the physical 
state of the stuck individual is often sufficient, with no need to understand intentions or 
knowledge. However, two scenarios included in our database do require an attribution of 
intention by the helper to the calf.  
Firstly, the three cases when calves were pushed out of a water channel, such as in the 
example described above, seem to require an understanding of the calf’s intention. In these 
cases, the adult responded to the signs of frustration or distress in the calf, but the act of 
helping it increased the physical distance between calf and adult. In contrast, pulling calves 
out of a channel does not necessarily require understanding the calf’s intention to climb out of 
the bank. The mother or allomother was already out of the channel, and - as with retrievals - 
upon seeing its distress at the physical separation, she acted to bring the calf near to her. 
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Similarly, digging the sides of a bank to allow a calf an easier ascent does not require an 
attribution of intent as in all cases the adult’s behaviour could be argued to be selfish, 
whereby the females dug the bank to also ease their own climb, although in most cases the 
adult could easily step out of the bank.  
The second scenario that required an attribution of intention describes a female 
leading a mother and calf to a shallower bank: 
“At 11.10ish Ella gives a ‘lets go’ rumble as she moves further down the swamp… At 
11.19 Ella goes into the swamp.  All the group are in the swamp except Elspeth and 
her calf, born 2000, and Eudora {Elspeth’s mother}. At 11.25 Eudora appears to 
‘lead’ Elspeth and the calf to a good place to enter the swamp - the only place where 
there is no mud.” 
JP: 3 June 2000 
In this case, Eudora had no need to enter the swamp at the point to which she led her daughter 
and granddaughter, her behaviour was adjusted specifically to the problem faced by the calf. 
 
Removing foreign objects (three cases) 
Only three records contribute to this category, although there are additional verbal reports that 
have not been included here as they do not conform to the criteria set out in Bates and Byrne 
(Bates & Byrne, 2007). One describes an adult {M324} pulling a tranquilising dart out of 
another male {M319} that had been darted by a vet prior to treatment for a spear wound.  
“After {M319} was darted, another male - M324 - approached M319 and kept on 
touching the dart. M324 then pulled the dart out and dropped it on the ground, and 
kept touching where the dart was. M324 was then pushing M319, then when M319 
went down, M324 left.”  SS: 4 September 2006. 
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The actor, M324, dropped the dart as soon as he had pulled it out, suggesting he was not 
interested in the dart itself, but rather in removing it from the other elephant.  
The second observation in this category describes a six-year old male investigating a 
spear that was penetrating the back of another juvenile {Matrix, born 2000}. The spear had 
entered just above the hip on the left hand side of the elephant, and came out about four 
inches further back, one inch below the spine, and was lodged in the wound. Matrix did not 
appear to be limping when walking, and was keeping pace with her mother Marjorie.  
“Matrix is swishing her tail onto the wounds almost constantly, and both the entry and 
exit wounds are oozing puss, but we can’t see any blood. At 10.35 Matrix mud 
splashes with Marjorie, and initially directed all sprayings to the wound area. … 11.07 
Matrix is dusting the wound. She does not throw dust anywhere else on her body, just 
on the wound. 11.12  Winona’s male calf (born 2000) moves out of the swamp near 
to Matrix.  He is standing just behind her.  He touches the spear (the exit side) with his 
trunk three times. As he did this Matrix stopped feeding and stood still. 11.15 The 
2000 male moved off, and Matrix stepped forward and continued feeding.  No 
vocalisations were heard.”   
LB & KS: 24 February 2006 
Matrix or Marjorie were not seen to investigate the wound with their trunks at any point, and 
there was apparently no attempt by the juvenile male to pull the spear out of Matrix. Verbal 
reports of other incidents suggest that sometimes elephants do attempt to pull out spears that 
protrude from other’s bodies, however.  
The final report in this category describes an experienced matriarch removing rubbish 
from her calf’s mouth.  
“Echo is with Esprit {born 2005} behind the Safari Lodge.  Echo picks up a plastic 
bag then drops it again almost immediately.  Esprit, standing right next to Echo, then 
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picks it up and starts to put it in her mouth.  Echo immediately picks the bag off her, 
holds it in her own trunk-curl for several seconds, then drops it and moves on.  Esprit 
moves with her.”  
LB & NN: 22 February 2006 
Interestingly, elephants frequently carry vegetation on their bodies, and conspecifics 
apparently pay little interest to these natural objects; there are no reported observations of 
individuals removing vegetation from another’s body, although they may play with and toss 
around vegetation from their own bodies before discarding it. Similarly, during experimental 
trials of a study that involved presentation of brightly coloured cloths to the elephant groups, 
several different individuals picked up a white cloth in some trials, and draped it over their 
bodies whilst walking along. On these occasions, we never observed others attempting to 
remove the cloth (Bates, Sayialel, Njiraini, Moss, Poole, & Byrne, 2007).  
 
Cognitive processes underlying removal of foreign objects 
In the cases presented here, the actors apparently recognised the dart, spear, and plastic bag as 
foreign objects that should not be in contact with the others’ bodies, and in two cases 
removed them. Minimally, this act could be achieved with knowledge of what is ‘normal’ for 
elephant bodies, with action taken to investigate or remove the visible objects that do not 
conform to this template. This explanation only works if clumps of vegetation carried on an 
elephant are seen as normal, which is plausible given how often researchers see this. 
However, it does not explain why no investigations were made of the cloths carried on others’ 
backs or tusks during the experimental trials. Such a minimal explanation of ‘norm’ 
attribution gives no significance to the fact that male M319 was visibly ill before he was 
darted, and in the case of Matrix, puss was seeping from the wounds: the potential health 
state of the individual should be irrelevant. We would therefore have to predict that elephants 
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would remove foreign objects from the bodies of any elephant, healthy or sick, irrespective of 
the nature of the foreign object. However, this prediction is apparently not supported, as it is 
only in cases where there is a visible injury or sickness, or the object presents a potential 
hazard, that another elephant has felt compelled to touch the foreign object.  
It is not possible to draw strong conclusions from only three observations, but these 
reports suggest that elephants can distinguish dangerous from benign foreign objects, perhaps 
using emotional and behavioural cues from the wounded animal, and it is this recognition that 
prompts the action to remove them. In addition, removal may be altruistic, as the interaction 
with a foreign object that is associated with illness, injury, or danger in another could be 
potentially dangerous to the actor as well.  
 
Discussion 
Based on the evidence presented here, as summarised in table 2, we would argue that 
elephants routinely recognise animacy and goal-directedness; that is, elephants recognise 
certain characteristic aspects of normal elephant behaviour, and have expectations about the 
outcomes usually achieved by such behaviour.  Furthermore, there is strong evidence that 
elephants are able to recognise accurately and respond appropriately to a range of emotions of 
other elephants, usually but not exclusively kin. Elephants therefore understand that other 
elephants are animate agents that can perform directed behaviours and experience 
autonomous emotions, which they can recognize.  
 It is important to realize that the 249 records discussed here almost certainly under-
represent the frequency with which elephants engage in these sorts of empathic behaviour. 
Behaviours such as comforting and seeking physical contact with calves can be observed 
every few minutes in Amboseli, and others such as coalitions, protection, and assisting with 
mobility probably also occur on a daily basis. Because they are now so familiar to observers, 
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these actions are now rarely recorded except during focal sampling or when they occur in 
circumstances that are noteworthy for another reason, although they were recorded more 
frequently in the first ten to fifteen years of the project. Given the potentially controversial 
nature of this paper, we have been careful to only include reports that fully conform to the 
criteria laid out by Bates and Byrne (2007). This stringency reduced our sample size, but we 
feel it was necessary. Even with this reduced sample of observations, we were still able to 
uncover some evidence, from behaviour in the category of ‘assisting mobility’, that elephants 
understand the physical competence and intentions of others, where these differ from their 
own. We anticipate that structured observations will in the future strengthen this conclusion.   
We therefore take it that elephants do indeed show certain kinds of empathy. Empathy 
can operate at a number of levels, from the simplest level of ‘contagion’, to a more 
sophisticated level described by de Waal (2008) as ‘sympathetic concern’. The latter is 
illustrated in our data by instances in which elephants offer protection and comfort to the 
calves of others, ‘babysit’ them or retrieve them from harm. The highest level of empathy de 
Waal describes, ‘empathic perspective taking’, is characterised by ‘targeted helping’ towards 
needy individuals. In our data, this was shown in several cases in which calves were helped to 
overcome mobility problems.   
Few animal species have been suggested to show such a high level of empathy. There 
seem to be three possible reasons for that: a genuine lack of ability, a lack (in the animals) of 
much functional utility to showing such empathy, or an antipathy (in the research community) 
towards labelling animal behaviour as empathic. Because of the inherent difficulty in 
measuring animals’ emotions and other mental states, animal behaviour researchers are 
understandably reluctant to appeal to empathy as a causal explanation: preferring alternatives 
that do not impute emotional state understanding, often going no further than a functional 
account. Intriguingly, this sparse and intellectually hygienic approach contrasts with how 
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(often the same) researchers typically talk about their subjects’ behaviour amongst each other! 
Invoking advanced cognitive capacities such as empathy is often the easiest way to describe 
an event to someone who did not themselves observe it, but it is another matter to prove their 
existence to a sceptical audience.   
Quite apart from these differences of interpretation, there are perhaps few species 
where individuals would benefit from empathic responses, whether or not they have the 
ability to show them. For many mammals, the only social period of life is a relatively brief 
period of dependence on the mother, and maternal solicitude is shown in routinely protective 
behaviour that can be explained by simpler means than empathy. Much the same applies to 
birds, although many bird species are pair bonded so both parents may supply care and 
protection. Only with species where several generations live socially and the group may 
contain both kin and non-kin with various degrees of affiliation, as with many anthropoid and 
some strepsirrhine primates, are researchers able in principle to detect the signs of empathic 
responses. In these cases, the ability to discriminate among individuals according to 
differences in their physical abilities, their knowledge and their needs and wants, may pay in 
evolutionary terms. It is, then, no surprise that it is in primates (de Waal, 1996, 2008) and in 
elephants that empathy has been detected. The level of empathic responsiveness of elephants 
seems exceptionally high, but fair comparison is difficult. For example, the relatively slowly 
developing infants of most primates would still be held close to their mothers at the age when 
elephant calves are often the subjects of helping by other elephants.  
It is obvious from the records we have discussed here that elephants are very sensitive 
to the distress of others, and remarkably capable of anticipating and preventing such distress. 
These reports mostly concern the potential distress of calves, and it is mostly relatives who 
react. As de Waal (2008) argued, empathy is the causal mechanism underlying directed 
altruism. In all animal species studied, altruism is most common along kin lines, but the high 
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reproductive ‘value’ of an elephant calf to mother and other kin (Lee, 1987b) particularly 
increases the adaptive value of any effective care by elephants. Nevertheless, as evidenced by 
a few of our records, adult elephants do sometimes help individuals who are not related to 
them; thus, not all empathic behaviour may be linked to kinship, and may represent a more 
generalized response to distress (Douglas-Hamilton et al 2006). Some of the many instances 
of altruism described in other animal species may also depend on empathy; but as yet it 
remains unclear if helping in any other species requires empathic comprehension of the 
distressing event. Other than elephants and primates, species likely to give convincing 
evidence of empathy are those, such as social carnivores, that show female philopatry (i.e. 
where females stay in the natal home area and adolescent males move away to breed) and 
altruistic and co-operative helping behaviours. For example, meerkats, which show many 
kinds of altruistic helping behaviour (Clutton-Brock et al., 2000; Clutton-Brock, Russell, 
Sharpe, Young, Balmforth, & McIlrath, 2002), would be interesting to consider from this 
perspective, but as yet no evidence of empathy has been reported.  
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Table 1: Empathic attributions potentially made by elephants 
 
Attribution of: Understanding that: Example  
Animacy Some entities can 
spontaneously generate 
behaviour 
Recognise that immobility of 
elephants is anomalous 
Goal directedness Behaviour can be 
directed at specific ends 
Expect a recurring behaviour to 
normally lead to the same 
outcome, e.g. a male chasing an 
oestrus female will mount her 
Emotion Others have emotions 
and that these can be 
different to one’s own 
Recognise another animal’s 
distress 
Physical 
competence 
Others have abilities and 
vulnerability and that 
these can be different to 
one’s own  
Realising that a calf cannot cross a 
cattle grid 
Perspective Others perceive things 
and that their perspective 
can be different to one’s 
own 
Recognise that another individual 
cannot perceive a danger from its 
location 
Intentions Others can have wants 
and needs that can be 
different from one’s own 
Realising that another’s aims have 
been thwarted, e.g. that a calf is 
trying to get out of a river but is 
stuck 
Knowledge-belief Others have beliefs and 
knowledge that can be 
different to one’s own 
Predicting another’s behaviour by 
computations of their ignorance or 
false beliefs e.g. working out that 
one’s calf might not know to 
avoid a poisonous fruit 
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Table 2: Summary of behaviours observed and the implications for cognition  
Behaviour Context Requirement Empathic 
attribution 
Anticipatory 
Coalitions 
Competition with 
other elephants 
Recognition of threat from 
third parties to allies  
Animacy  
Goal directedness 
Emotion  
Protection Pre-empting and 
preventing 
injury/danger 
Recognition of danger to 
others 
Animacy  
Goal directedness 
Emotion 
Response to 
injury/danger 
Recognition that another has 
been hurt 
Animacy  
Emotion 
Comfort Physical 
reassurance 
Recognition of physical 
distress of calf 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Social 
reassurance 
Recognition of emotional 
distress of calf 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Refusal of 
allosuckling 
Recognition of identify of calf Animacy 
Goal directedness 
Babysitting Related calves Recognition that calf is not 
with its mother 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Unrelated calves Recognition that calf is not 
with its mother 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Retrievals Calf left alone Remembering that calf should 
be present 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Calf with 
individuals it 
wandered towards 
Recognition of calf and that it 
should be present 
Animacy 
Emotion 
Calf with 
individuals that 
drew it away 
Recognition of calf and that it 
should be present 
Animacy 
Goal directedness 
Emotion 
Assisting 
Mobility 
Leading Recognition that calf cannot 
negotiate certain terrain 
Animacy  
Physical competence 
Helping to stand Recognition that calf cannot 
stand  
Animacy  
Physical competence 
Emotion 
Pulling out of 
ditches etc. 
Recognition that calf 
distressed because lacks 
ability to join mother  
Animacy  
Physical competence 
Emotion 
Pushing out of 
ditches etc. 
Recognition that calf wants to 
get out of ditch but lacks 
ability  
Animacy 
Physical competence 
Intention 
Leading by a third 
party 
Recognition that mother’s 
efforts will be insufficient to 
overcome calf’s physical 
inability  
Animacy 
Physical competence 
Intention 
Removing 
foreign 
objects 
Darts, spears, 
rubbish 
Recognition that object is 
unusual and dangerous 
Animacy 
Emotion 
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